Delayed quota adjustments, and/or lagged fishing effort and catch by harvesters, to 24 changes in stock abundance may induce unstable population dynamics and exacerbate the risk of 25 fishery collapse. We examined a 39-y time series of change to quotas by managers, and to effort 26 and catch by both commercial harvesters and anglers, in response to changes in Lake Erie 27 walleye abundance (Sander vitreus) estimated both contemporaneously and retrospectively. 28
Quotas, commercial effort and catch were entrained by contemporaneous estimates of stock 29 abundance. Recreational effort and harvest were not; they had better tracked abundance, as better 30 estimated today, than did the commercial fishery. During the 1990s, a significant mismatch 31 developed between the quota-driven commercial harvest and stock abundance that persisted until The outcome should depend on the degree of responsiveness by managers (through stock 51 assessment and setting of annual quotas) and harvesters (through changes in fishing effort and 52 harvest) to variation in stock abundance. For a fishery in which responses to variation in stock 53 abundance are perfectly compensatory, rates of change in annual quota might be expected to be 54 scaled to the magnitude and direction of expected rates of changes in stock abundance (Clark 55 1990, Walters and Pearse 1996) . However, estimates of stock abundance used in stock 56 assessments for purposes of establishing quotas may lack the precision or accuracy needed to 57 detect changes in recruitment or natural mortality before stocks become overfished (Beamish and  58 McFarlane 1983, Peterman and Bradford 1987, Walters and Maguire 1996) . Managers 59 attempting to balance ecological, economic and social objectives can face considerable 60 uncertainty associated with stock assessments and model interpretation , Fulton 61 et al. 2011 . Similarly, responses by commercial and recreational harvesters to changes in stock 62 abundance may also be expected to vary in magnitude and direction and to differ between the 63 two types of harvesters. For example, management agencies often do not have the same control 64 over effort and harvest of recreational fisheries as they do over quota-managed commercial 65 fisheries (Post et al. 2012 , MacKenzie and Cox 2013). Further, whereas recreational effort and 66 harvest should be strongly driven by angler satisfaction (i.e., angler catch rates), commercial 67 harvesters should, so long as it is profitable, fish until quota is reached for a given year. 68
To examine responses by managers and harvesters to variation in stock abundance, we 69 developed a conceptual framework with which to compare the magnitude and direction of annual 70 rates of change in quota by managers, as well as effort and harvest by recreational and 71 commercial harvesters, to annual rates of change in stock abundance. In this context, deviations 72 from perfectly scaled fishery responses to variation in rates of change in stock abundance will 73 vary with respect to the consequences they pose to the stability of the entire fishery (Fig. 1) . A 74 fishery more highly responsive to variation in stock abundance should exhibit (1) slopes of rates 75 of change in quota, effort and harvest on rates of change in stock abundance close to 1; and (2) 76 greater R 2, such that there are fewer, smaller deviations in directions that would, on one hand, 77 increase the probability of overexploitation (positive deviations) and, on the other, increase the 78 probability of poor economic or social outcomes for recreational (i.e., low catch rates) and 79 commercial fisheries (low catch rates, low quotas; negative deviation; Fig. 1 
Study system 90
The Lake Erie walleye fishery is uniquely characterized by commercial and recreational fisheries 91 that are largely confined to Canadian and to US waters, respectively, but share the same stock 92 and management authority (Fig. 2) , providing the opportunity to contrast between commercial 93 and recreational fisheries controlling, to the extent possible, for potentially confounding sources 94 of variation. 95
In recent years, an average of about three million walleye were harvested annually by both 96 commercial and recreational fisheries in Lake Erie (Lake Erie WTG 2015). The quota-regulated 97 commercial fishery consists almost exclusively of a large mesh gill net fishery. The recreational 98 fishery is officially assigned quota for purposes of allocating the annual total allowable catch 99 To compare responses by managers (i.e., annual rate of changes in quota), commercial and 125 recreational fisheries (i.e., changes in effort and harvest) to changes in estimated walleye 126 abundance, we used generalized linear models (GLS) to regress annual rates of change in quota, 127 commercial and recreational effort and harvest against the annual rate of change in abundance 128 (e.g., ln N t+1 /N t ). For these relationships, we tested whether slopes of regressions forced through 129 the origin differed from 1 (perfect compensatory response to change in stock abundance, see 130 framework in Fig. 1 ) using the following format: (y-x) ~ x where x = rate of change in 131 abundance and y = rate of change in quota or harvest. We extracted the regression slope estimate 132 and standard error of the relationships and calculated a pseudo-R 2 using the deviance explained 133
to get an estimate of the dispersion of the residuals.We used an autoregressive correlation 134 structure (corAR1) to control for temporal autocorrelation in the GLS.We determined the 135 autoregressive process in each time series by plotting each time series and by observing the 136 autocorrelation function (ACF) and the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) on detrended 137 data using an ARIMA (autoregressive integrated moving average model) diagnostic (astsa 138 package v. 1.3 in R; Stoffer 2014). For each time series, errors were specified to follow an 139 autoregressive process of degree 1 (i.e. the autocorrelation is highest between sequential years). 140 GLS models with autocorrelated structure always had stronger AICc support ( Fig. 3 ). Quota adjustments by 147 PREPRINT 8 managers followed changes in stock abundance estimated at the time (contemporaneous 148 estimates) quite well, both in magnitude and direction (Fig. 3 a) . Commercial effort and harvest, 149 tracked changes in quota and thus contemporaneous estimates in abundance (Fig. 3 a-b) , whereas 150 recreational effort and harvest did not (Fig. 3 a-c) . Instead, recreational effort and harvest 151 corresponded more closely with changes in abundance as derived from the latest catch-at-age 152 model (Fig. 3) . 153
Direction and magnitude of compensatory responses 154
Overall, annual rates of change in quotas, effort and harvest for both fisheries were positively 155 correlated with annual rates of change in abundance (Fig. 4) , but the slope of all regressed 156 variables differed significantly from hypothetical values 1. The strength of the relation between 157 rate of change in effort and harvest and the rate of change in abundance differed between 158 commercial and recreational fisheries (Fig. 4) (Fig. 4) . 167
Deviations between the annual rate of change in quota and contemporaneous abundance 168 estimates were relatively evenly distributed around the 1:1 relationship, i.e., between increased 169 probability of overexploitation (positive deviations) and increased probability of low or negative 170 profits for commercial harvesters and poor angler satisfaction in recreational fisheries (negative 171 deviations; Fig. 5 a) . The magnitudes of the deviations from the 1:1 line were greater during the 172 late 1980s and early 1990s and of much smaller magnitude since 2007, suggesting greater 173 responsiveness, of improved magnitude and direction, to change in stock abundance (Fig. 6 a) . 174
Commercial harvest was strongly entrained by quota, so the direction and magnitude of the 175 deviations between commercial harvest and abundance are comparable to those of quota (Fig. 5  176 b, Fig. 6 b) . In recreational harvest, 56% of the deviations were in the regions corresponding with 177 increased probability of overfishing (Fig. 5 c) and, contrary to quota and commercial harvest, the 178 deviations in recent years were of high magnitude suggesting that the recreational fishery may be 179 becoming less responsive to changes in abundance (Fig. 6 c) . 180
We developed a conceptual framework to evaluate compensatory responses of managers 182 and harvesters to changes in stock abundance and used it to examine a rich dataset from Lake 183
Erie walleye commercial and recreational fisheries. Managers were responsive in changing and 184 setting quotas in response to available information about changes in stock abundance at the time 185 (contemporaneous estimates). Commercial fisheries responded differently to changes in stock 186 abundance and quotas than recreational fisheries. Commercial harvest and effort were strongly 187 entrained by quotas whereas recreational fisheries better tracked abundance as retrospectively 188 increasing probability of overfishing increased from 53% to 65% (Fig. B1 c-d) . Thus, a series of 207 small, consecutive, unscaled and untimely compensatory adjustments of quotas in response to 208 changes in walleye abundance generated potentially long-term social, economic and ecological 209 negative impacts. These unscaled adjustments were apparently due to a false impression of a 210 healthy walleye stock at that time. annual rate of change in abundance and quota). Nonetheless, deviation using retrospective 218 estimates in abundance suggest that quota responses continue to periodically strongly over-and 219 under-compensate for changes in estimated stock abundance (Fig. B1 b) , consistent with the idea 220 that model uncertainty still manifests and might lend to lagged or weak responses to changing 221 stock abundance, exacerbating the likelihood of negative outcomes for the entire fishery. We attribute this rapid adjustment of effort by anglers to the large, highly-networked charter boat 252 fleet and angling groups in Ohio and Michigan, to numerous online resources about the status of 253 the walleye fishery for anglers, and intense coverage of the fishery in print media and other news 254 outlets. Social sharing of information about the state and quality of these fisheries is likely very 255 rapid in this particular valuable fishery system. However, recreational harvest and effort was less 256 responsive to more recent rapid changes in quota and abundance (Fig. 3 b) On the other hand, our analysis suggests that the commercial walleye fishery was strongly 266 regulated by annual variation in quotas. As long as it is profitable, commercial fishermen have a 267 strong incentive to continue fishing for walleye until the quota is reached, but, unlike recreational 268 anglers, they will tend to stay in the fishery because of significant investment in quota, vessels 269 and gear, and because many commercial fishermen have options to gain alternative revenues by 270 fishing for species other than walleye. Management of a declining fish stock is typically a delay-271 ridden process. Because catch reductions impose short-term losses on fishers, merchants, and 272 processors, managers face political opposition-and even legal challenges-and they may 273 hesitate to change the status quo (Rosenberg 2003) . responding to variation in abundance should exhibit a slope of 1 (dotted red line). Above 469 the dotted white line (positive deviations), changes in quota increase the probability of 470 overexploitation; below it (negative deviations), changes to quota increase probability of 471 poor economic or social outcomes for recreational and commercial fisheries (i.e., 472 opportunity costs, satisfaction). In regions 1 and 4, annual rates of change in quota 473 overcompensate for changes in abundance, i.e., they increase or decrease, respectively, 474 faster than the rate at which abundance size changes. Similarly, in regions 3 and 6, quota 475 responses undercompensate for changes in abundance. In regions 2 and 5, quota responses 476 to changes in stock size diverged as to be opposing; in these regions, ecological risk to 477 stocks and economic risk to fisheries, respectively, should be particularly exacerbated, 478 corresponding to greater risk of fishery decline. 479 
